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Standard theory of small open economies predicts a smooth path for con-
sumption and investment over time, and procyclical current account balances
and employment. This contrasts with the data for emerging countries, where
consumption, investment and employment are highly procyclical and volatile,
and the current account balance is counter cyclical. Previous studies have rec-
onciled theory and data using diﬀerent households preferences for emerging
countries vs. developed ones, either a lower intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution or the use of GHH type of preferences. This paper takes a diﬀerent
approach. It explores whether adding two ﬁnancial frictions to an otherwise
standard small open economy model, an external borrowing constraint and
labor ﬁnancing wedges, can reconcile theory and data without appealing to
changes in preferences, but rather to market imperfections widely studied in
the literature for the emerging world. I ﬁnd that adding the external borrowing
constraint makes consumption and investment more procyclical and volatile,
and reproduces the counter cyclical path of the current account. However,
it generates counter cyclical employment. Adding the labor ﬁnancing wedges
reproduces the cyclical path of this variable as well
11 Introduction
Developing countries’ business cycles during the 1980s and 1990s were characterized
by highly procyclical consumption and investment, counter cyclical current account
balances and procyclical employment. This contrasts with the predictions of small
open economy models when standard preferences from the real business cycles liter-
ature are considered. These models predict that consumption and investment should
be smoothed through external borrowing, while the current account balance and em-
ployment should be procyclical.
Mendoza [25], [26] and [27], Correia et al. [14] and Schmitt-Grohe et al. [29] ap-
proached the issue assuming GHH type preferences or a lower intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in developing countries than in developed ones. GHH type preferences
makes the labor-leisure decision independent from consumption and wealth eﬀect, set-
ting it only as a function of the real wage. In this way, employment over react to
shocks, which causes bigger ﬂuctuations in output, consumption and investment, and
a counter cyclical pattern for current account, everything in line with the data. A
low intertemporal elasticity of substitution create the same cyclical ﬂuctuations.
T h ea p p r o a c hi nt h i sp a p e ri sd i ﬀerent. I will argue that is not necessary to
assume diﬀerent preferences for consumers in developing vs developed countries to
reconcile data and theory, but rather private agents in the emerging economies face
two types of ﬁnancial frictions that limit their optimal response to shocks. First,
they face a limited access to the external capital market, identiﬁed in the paper as
an external borrowing constraint, which refrain them from smoothing consumption
and investment over time, and second, they face an counter cyclical internal ﬁnancial
distortions that reduces the costs of credit to the ﬁrms with lack of collateral during
booms, but increases them during recessions. This last distortion allows the model
to capture the cyclical properties of employment observed in data.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively, in a general equilibrium
framework, whether adding these two ﬁnancial frictions to a standard small open
economy model, would help reconciling theory and data without appealing to non
standard assumption of preferences. These two frictions have been studied in the
literature as ampliﬁers or source of economic ﬂuctuations in the developing economies.
The quantitative analysis is made taken Chile as a case study, for which Caballero
[8] and [9] argued that the interaction between both frictions played a major role
amplifying its cycles during the 1990s.
The analysis is done in consecutive steps. First, a frictionless small open economy
model is calibrated and simulated for exogenous sequences of shocks in terms of trade,
external interest rate and total factor productivity between 1992 and 2000. Consecu-
tively, each friction is added exogenously to the model to quantify their contribution
to improve the matching of the model to the data.
2The simulations show that the external borrowing constraint reduces consumption
and investment smoothing over time, as well as replicates the counter cyclical path
of current account. However, for standard speciﬁcation of preferences, it produces
counter cyclical hours worked and a smoother path of output of non tradable than in
data. Adding counter cyclical sector speciﬁc labor ﬁnancing wedges allows the model
t os o l v et h i sp r o b l e m .
The average labor wedge that makes the model replicate the path of output in
data is similar to the internal lending spread between 1993 and 1998, but higher in
1999 and 2000. This suggests that the lending spread in data is misleading as a
measure of internal ﬁnancing frictions during recessions. It does not account for the
high spread faced by small and medium size ﬁrms, with lack of collateral, which are
crowded out of the internal ﬁnancial market in bad times.
The external constraint arises because contracts in external lending are not en-
forceable and there is a risk of default. Atkeson and Rios-Rull [4] and Caballero and
Krishnamurthy [10] identiﬁed this friction as a collateral constraint, in which part of
the exportable sector’s proﬁts or revenues could be seized by external lenders in case
of default. Eaton and Gersovitz [15], Bulow and Rogoﬀ [7], Atkeson [3], Kehoe and
Levine [22], Kocherlacota [23], Alvarez and Jerman [2] and Jeske [21] considered the
punishment by defaulting as the exclusion from the external capital market. Wright
[29] argued that the country’s concern for it’s reputation can enforce repayment with-
out placing any technological restriction on the ability of banks to oﬀer contracts as
long as there are incentives for banks to tacitly culled to punish a country in default.
This paper speciﬁes the constraint as the external lenders’ requirement to the in-
ternal households to ﬁnance at least a fraction of their expenditures with their current
income, Mendoza [27]. This fraction is taken from data and introduced exogenously
to the model assuming that such constraint was always binding. In this setup, a
positive shock that makes the constraint less binding, will make households increase
consumption of tradable and non tradable goods. The former can be obtained abroad,
while the latter has to be produced domestically. Thus, there is a lower expansion
in the tradable sector than in a frictionless model, which makes the current account
counter cyclical. A negative shock triggers the opposite.
However, for standard speciﬁcation of preferences, this setup produces counter
c y c l i c a le m p l o y m e n ta n das m o o t h e ro u t p u to fn o nt r a d a b l et h a ni nd a t a .M e n d o z a
[25], [26] and [27], and Neumeyer and Perry [28] used GHH preferences to attack this
problem, for which the labor-leisure decision depends only on the wage and not on
wealth eﬀects. But, these preferences are incompatible with balanced growth path
and diﬀer from the standard speciﬁcations in the real business cycles literature. This
paper shows that this problem can be solved by considering counter cyclical sector
speciﬁcl a b o rﬁnancing wedges, with no need of setting non standard preferences.
The ﬁnancial friction for domestic producers arises from informational and moral
hazard problems that create ﬁnancial constraints among ﬁrms or with banks, which
3limits a country’s ability to reallocate resources in response to shocks. Holmstrom and
Tirole [20] derive them from moral hazard problems, Bernanke and Gertler [6] from
”costly state veriﬁcation” problems, while Kiyotaki and Moore [24] and Caballero
and Krishnamurthy [10] considered them as collateral constraints.
This paper sets this friction as sector speciﬁc labor ﬁnancing wedges, in which the
cost of paying wages in advance to production diﬀers across sectors and ﬂuctuates
with the cycle. Chari at all [13] showed that a credit in advance friction can be
represented in this way, methodology that is used in this paper to deduct the wedges
that allow the model to replicate the path of output in data.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an empirical motivation, sec-
tion 3 presents a literature review, section 4 discusses the objective and methodology,
section 5 presents the model and simulations for the frictionless economy, sections 6
and 7 present the model and simulations when the external borrowing constraint and
the labor ﬁnancing wedges are added respectively, and section 9 concludes.
2 Empirical Motivation
This section presents empirical evidence of lack of consumption smoothing, counter
cyclical current accounts and procyclical employment in developing countries. It then
discusses why Chile is a good case study, and describes the cycles and shocks that
this country faced during the 1990’s as well as the methodology to construct them.
2.1 Business Cycles in Developing Countries
Standard real business cycles models predict a more procyclical consumption in de-
veloped countries than in developing ones. For the former group, the interest rate is
endogenous and consumption varies in response to temporary shocks, while for the
latter group, the interest rate is exogenously given by the external capital market and
consumption is smooth and independent from these shocks.
Table 1 presents the data on standard deviations of detrended output and current
account as percentage of GDP (columns 1 and 9), relative standard deviations to de-
trended GDP (columns 3, 5 and 7) and correlations to detrended GDP (columns 2, 4,
6 and 8) of detrended private consumption, gross ﬁx capital formation, employment
and current account balance as percentage of GDP for diﬀerent groups of industrial-
ized and emerging economies between 1980 and 2001. It shows that in data, emerging
countries’ consumption and investment were almost as procyclical, and more volatile
relative to GDP, than in the industrialized countries, particularly in Latin America
and South East Asia. Thus, developing countries did not smooth consumption and
investment over time as the standard theories would predict. This fact motivates the
introduction of a external borrowing constraint to the model, which refrains internal
households from smoothing both variables over time.
4The correlation between consumption and GDP, as well as their volatility, has
a direct correspondence to the correlation among GDP, employment and current
account. Table 1 shows that in data, employment in developing countries is as pro-
cyclical, and more volatile relative to GDP, than in the industrialized countries, while
the current account in Latin America and South East Asia is as counter cyclical, but
more volatile, than for this group of countries.
Table 1
Business Cycles Indicators (1980-2001)1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
St.Dev. Correl. SD C/ Correl. SD I/ Correl. SD L/ Correl. St.Dev.
Y C to Y SD Y I to Y SD Y L to Y SD Y CA to Y CA/Y
G7 0.019 0.90 1.14 0.89 3.11 0.47 0.49 -0.40 0.016
Others OECD 0.024 0.82 1.10 0.86 3.65 0.53 0.40 -0.30 0.030
Developing Countries 0.041 0.69 1.39 0.73 3.82 0.50 0.52 -0.24 0.044
Africa 0.038 0.61 1.71 0.60 3.87 na na -0.08 0.043
Latin America 0.043 0.76 1.20 0.83 3.85 0.44 0.61 -0.29 0.034
Chile 0.053 0.94 1.41 0.96 3.10 0.20 0.75 -0.29 0.037
Middle East 0.042 0.51 1.37 0.58 4.36 0.72 0.57 -0.43 0.050
South East Asia 0.044 0.82 1.11 0.84 3.32 0.60 0.28 -0.41 0.062
Therefore, business cycles in developing countries were characterized by a pro-
cyclical and non smooth path of consumption and investment over time, a procyclical
and volatile employment, and a counter cyclical and volatile current account balance.
This contrasts with standard theories for small open economies, in which consump-
tion is smooth over time, and the current account and employment are procyclical.
This motivates the introduction of ﬁnancial frictions to the model to explore up what
extent are able to reconcile theory and data.
1GDP and Private Consumption and Investment correspond to log deviations from the trend.
Africa: Algeria, Burundi, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbawe.
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
South East Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand.
Middle East: Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Siryan Arab Republic.
52.2 Chile as a Case Study
Chile is taken as a case study for two reasons. First, it presents the same pattern
in consumption, investment, employment and current account in data than the other
emerging economies. Second, it is widely cited in the literature as one of the most
successful and disciplined economies in Latin America since the mid 1980s, which
makes reasonable to simplify the analysis to a simple exchange - production economy,
for which ﬁscal or monetary policy shocks are not important as source or ampliﬁers
of cycles.
This section discusses ﬁrst Chile’s economic policy and structural reforms to moti-
vate the setting of the model as a simple exchange - production economy, abstracting
from economic policy shocks. Second, it shows the lack of consumption smoothing as
a motivation to consider an external borrowing constraint in the analysis. Third, it
discusses the relevance of internal ﬁnancial frictions as a motivation of sector speciﬁc
labor ﬁnancing frictions. Fourth, it presents this economy’s business cycles, shocks
and the methodology to construct them during the 1990s.
2.2.1 Economic Policy and Structural Reforms
Since the late 1970’s, Chile undertook several structural reforms in trade policy,
ﬁscal policy, privatization, banking and bankruptcy, to promote growth and reduce
volatility. Bergoing et all [5] made the following review of them:
Trade policy: By 1979 Chile had eliminated all quantitative barriers on imports
and imposed an uniform tariﬀ of 10 percent. This tariﬀ was increased to 20 percent
in 1983 and to 35 percent in 1984, and then gradually lowered until it fell below its
original level in 1991.
Fiscal policy: There was a major tax reform in 1975, a major social security
reform in 1980, and another major tax reform in 1984.
Privatization: By 1973 a large fraction of the economy was under government
control. From 1974 to 1979, the government reprivatized much of it. The number of
state companies was reduced from 596 in 1973 to 48 in 1983, although the portion of
GDP generated by them just fell from 39 percent to 24 percent.
Banking: In 1973 Chile had 18 national banks and 1 foreign bank. After several
reforms that included deregulation, low reserve requirements, and opening to foreign
competition, the number of ﬁnancial institution increased by 1980 to 26 national
banks, 19 foreign banks and 15 ﬁnancieras (non-bank ﬁnancial institutions subject to
less stringent regulations). After the collapse in 1982, the government liquidated in-
solvent banks and ﬁnancieras, quickly reprivatized solvent banks taken over because of
liquidity problems, and set up a new regulatory framework to avoid mismanagement.
Bankruptcy: By the end of the 1970’s Chile had an obsolete and unwieldy bank-
ruptcy law, which relied on poorly paid public oﬃcials and highly bureaucratic proce-
6dures, which made bankruptcy proceedings languish for years in court. Following an
administrative reform of the bankruptcy management service in 1978, the 1982 bank-
ruptcy reformed law clearly deﬁned the rights of each creditor and replaced public
oﬃcials by private oﬃcials, making the bankruptcy proceedings much quicker.
Besides these reforms, Chile maintained ﬁscal and monetary discipline since the
mid 1980s. On the ﬁscal side, Figure 1 shows that the ﬁscal balance as percentage
of GDP was stable during all 1990’s, which contrasts with its behavior during the
1970’s and ﬁrst half of the 1980’s. Based on this, ﬁscal shocks were excluded from
the analysis of Chile’s cycles during the 1990’s, arguing that they did not play an
important role in the origin or ampliﬁcation of them.
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In the monetary side, Central Bank’s independence was imposed in 1990, and
since then inﬂation fell from 26 percent in 1989 to 3 percent in 2000, see Figure 2.
The price stability achieved during the 1990s together with the impediment by law
for the central bank to buy ﬁscal debt, suggests that monetary imbalances did not
play an important role in the origin or ampliﬁcation of cycles. For that reason, the
monetary side of the economy is excluded from the analysis, leaving a model focussed
only on real variables.
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72.2.2 Absence of Consumption Smoothing
Figure 3 presents the rates of growth of GDP, private consumption and investment
in Chile during the 1990’s. It shows a high correlation between consumption and
GDP, a sympthom of lack of consumption smoothing. Investment is also highly
correlated to GDP, although more volatile. This contrasts with the implications of
the standard theory, in which consumption is smoother than output. This motivates
the introduction of a external borrowing constraint into the analysis, which could
have been always binding given the high correlation between consumption and GDP.
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2.2.3 Internal Financial Frictions:
This section is based on Caballero [9]. He argued that during the recession in 1999,
domestic banks in Chile reacted slowing down private loans even though domestic
deposit continue growing fast. They substituted private domestic loans by public debt
and external assets. At the same time, there was a ”ﬂight to quality” phenomenon,
in which domestic banks allocated a higher fraction of their credit to big size ﬁrms,
reducing considerably the access to credit to small and medium size ﬁrms. Big ﬁrms
could substitute their ﬁnancial needs in the domestic ﬁnancial market, while many
small and medium size ﬁrms were crowded out from it.
This analysis suggests that small and medium size ﬁrms have a better access to
internal ﬁnancing in booms than in recessions. Thus, the lending spread in data is
misleading as a measure of this distortion, because it does not account for the high
spread that ﬁrms crowded out of the ﬁnancial market face in bad times.
82.2.4 Shocks and the Internal Cycle
Figure 4 presents Chile’s real GDP index and its trend for the 1990’s. Chile experi-
enced a boom between 1995 and 1998, and a recession in 1999, from which it had not
recovered. The boom coincided with a fall in unemployment, a deterioration in the
current account balance and big capital inﬂows. The recession coincided with a sharp
improvement in the current account balance, a sudden reversal in capital inﬂows and
an abrupt increase in unemployment.
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Figure 5 presents the sequences of external interest rate, terms of trade and total
factor productivity, in log-deviations from 1992. The external interest rate corre-
sponds to the federal funds rate minus ex-post inﬂa t i o ni nt h eU Sa n dt h et e r m so f
trade to the price exports over the price of imports. To estimate total factor pro-
ductivity was necessary to build the sectorial series output, capital stock and hours
worked.
The exportable sector’s GDP corresponds to Mining, Agriculture and Forestry,
Fishery and Manufacturing, equivalent to 36 percent of total GDP. The Non Tradable
sector’s output corresponds to Wholesale and Retail Trade, Construction, Electricity,
Gas and Water, Financial Services, Housing, Personal Services, Public Administration
and Transport, Storage and Communication, equivalent to 64 percent of total GDP.
The following law of motion for capital was used to construct the series of aggre-
gate capital stock in stationary terms:






The ratio capital stock to GDP was taken from Bergoing et all [5]. The depreci-
ation rate was set in 8 percent according the United Nations estimations, and v was
set in 2.1. This parameters, together with investment from data, yield a capital stock
consistent with balanced growth path and with Aguilar and Collinao [1] estimations.
9Total hours worked were constructed using the series of total employment from
the National Institute of Statistics and average hours worked per employee reported
by the ILO. The normalized value of hours worked corresponds to the average hours
worked times the number of employed people, divided by the potential working time
of the total working age population.
Aggregate total factor productivity was estimated using aggregate GDP, capital
stock and hours worked, and assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with a
capital share fraction of 0.47. To estimate the relative allocation of hours worked and
capital stock in each sector, it was assumed that capital is sector speciﬁca n dl a b o r
is freely mobile across sectors. Assuming that both sectors present Cobb-Douglas













Having the sectorial output and hours worked, the sectorial allocation of capital
and total factor productivity were estimated using both sectors production functions,
the market equilibrium condition for capital, and the condition that equates the
average total factor productivity to the aggregate estimation of it.
Figure 5: Internal and External Shocks (log-deviations from 1992)
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Figure 5 suggests that the internal cycles were induced by the terms of trade shocks
rather than by internal shocks or by shocks to the external interest rate. The terms
10of trade present large deviations, a maximum of 20 percent in 1995, and a minimum
of -10 percent in 1999, which coincides with the beginning of each cycle. Total factor
productivity and external interest rate shocks presented smaller deviations.
3 Literature Review
The literature has studied the idiosyncratic properties of business cycles in develop-
ing countries in deep. Mendoza [25] highlighted two main regularities in data for
the developing countries business cycles: The positive correlation between domestic
savings and domestic investment, and the countercyclical patter of the current ac-
count and the balance of trade. On the other hand, Correia et al. [14] deﬁned the
following regularities for the Portuguese economy: Consumption, output, investment
and employment are positively correlated, while the trade balance is counter cyclical.
Mendoza [25], [26] and [27], Correia et al. [14] and Schmitt-Grohe et al. [29]
approached the issue assuming GHH type preferences or a low intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for developing countries. Correia et al. [14] showed that assuming
GHH type preferences makes the labor-leisure decision independent from consumption
and wealth, setting it only as a function of the real wage. In this way, employment over
react to shocks, creating bigger ﬂuctuations in output, consumption and investment,
and a counter cyclical current account. Using the standard preferences used in close
economy real business cycles models does not capture important features of small
open economies business cycles. The volatility of consumption is much lower that
suggested by the data, and the trade balance is procyclical instead of counter cyclical.
Other studies of idiosyncratic properties of business cycles in developing countries
have emphasized the relevance of market incompleteness and credit constraints in
these economies when compared to the industrialized ones. For example, Caballero
[8] stated: ”Latin American economies are weak in two dimensions: links with the
international ﬁnancial markets and development of domestic ﬁnancial markets. Those
two ingredients, either directly or by leveraging a variety of standard shocks, probably
account for much of ﬂuctuations and crises in modern Latin America”.
”Underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets ultimately limit the prompt reallocation of re-
sources, creating wasteful contractions in those markets most aﬀected by shocks or less
plugged into the ﬁnancial system”. ”Weak links to international ﬁnancial markets are
simply ﬁnancial constraints, possible time varying, that limit the public and private
international borrowing of emerging countries. These constraints limit the smoothing
of shocks over time and are themselves a source of shocks”.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy [10] analyzed the interaction of this two frictions in
a model that features two types of collateral constraints. First, ﬁrms in a domestic
economy have limited borrowing capacity from international investors, and second,
they also have limited borrowing capacity with respect to each other. They found that
11these two constraints can interact in important ways. The ﬁrst is disintermediation:
a ﬁre sale of domestic assets causes banks to fail reallocating resources across ﬁrms
leading to wasted international collateral. The second is a dynamic eﬀect, in which
ﬁrms with limited domestic collateral and a binding international collateral constraint
will not adequately precaution against adverse shocks, increasing the severity of them.
Weak links to the external markets has been identiﬁed in previous studies as
collateral external borrowing constraints, in which part of the exportable sector’s
proﬁts or revenues can be seized by the external lenders in case of default. See for
example Atkeson and Rios-Rull [4] and Caballero and Krishnamurthy [10]. Another
approach used to identify this constraint is to take the punishment by defaulting as the
exclusion from the external capital market after this event. See for example Eaton and
Gersovitz [15], Bulow and Rogoﬀ[7], Atkeson [3], Kehoe and Levine [22], Kocherlacota
[23], Alvarez and Jerman [2] and Jeske [21]. Wright [30] argued that the country’s
concern for it’s reputation can enforce repayment without placing any technological
restriction on the ability of banks to oﬀer contracts, and without appealing to any
m e c h a n i s m so u t s i d eo ft h ec r e d i tm a r k e t ,a sl o n ga st h e r ea r ei n c e n t i v e sf o rb a n k st o
tacitly culled in punishing a country in default.
Mendoza [27] set this constraint as the external lender’s requirement to the house-
holds to ﬁnance at least a fraction of their expenditures with current income, arguing
that it could result from an optimal contract model with traditional ﬁnancial-market
frictions, and that it is consistent with the lending criteria used in mortgage and
consumers loans. In his setup, a sudden stop in capital inﬂows is generated by an
abrupt switch on the constraint from slack to binding in response to negative shocks.
Domestic ﬁnancial frictions are microeconomics ﬁnancial constraints, either among
ﬁrms or banks, limit a country’s ability to reallocate resources in response to shocks.
Holmstrom and Tirole [20] derive them from moral hazard problems, Bernanke and
Gertler [6] from ”costly state veriﬁcation” problems, while Kiyotaki and Moore [24]
and Caballero and Krishnamurthy [10] assumed internal collateral constraints.
Other authors have identiﬁed them assuming that ﬁr m sp a yt h er e n to fc a p i t a l
and wages in advance to production, facing a credit in advance constraint. See for
example. Edwards and Vegh [17] and Neumeyer and Perry [28]. Chari at all [13]
showed that an input ﬁnancing friction of this type can be represented as a time
varying productivity wedge, under which a ﬁrm speciﬁc input ﬁnancing tax would
capture the magnitude of the distortion for each ﬁrm.
4 Objective and Methodology
The goal of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively, in a general equilibrium frame-
work, the role played by two ﬁnancial frictions, an external borrowing constraint and
labor wedges, in the origin and ampliﬁcation of the Chilean economy’s cycles during
12the 1990s. First, a friction-less small open economy model is calibrated and simulated
for exogenous sequences of shocks in terms of trade, external interest rate and total
factor productivity. Consecutively each friction is added to the model exogenously,
quantifying their role in the ampliﬁcation and origin of the internal cycles.
Capital is sector speciﬁc, while labor is freely mobile across sectors. The external
borrowing constraint is set as the external lenders’ requirement to the households
to ﬁnance at least a fraction Ψ of their expenditure with their current income. The
labor ﬁnancing friction is identiﬁed as a sector speciﬁcl a b o rw e d g e .T h es i m u l a t i o n s
are presented as log-deviations from the steady state.
5 Friction-Less Small Open Economy
The standard setup for a friction less small open economy assumes that the home
economy has free and costless access to the external market. However, in this setup
consumption and external assets have random walk processes when the model is log-
linearized. Both variables reach new steady state values in response to shocks.
To have a unique steady state, it is necessary to introduce a device that anchors the
level of external debt in this equilibrium. Previous studies have considered either an
upward sloping supply of external funds, a cost function of adjusting the external asset
portfolio or an endogenous discount factor. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [28] showed
that any of this formulations yield the same dynamics in terms of ﬁrst and second
moments. To be consistent with the following sections, an exogenous upward sloping
supply of external funds was used to set up the frictionless version of the model.
5.1 Model
Consider a small open economy perfectly integrated with the rest of the world in








Where η and b are parameters, Rt i st h ei n t e r n a lr a t eo fr e t u r n ,bt is the net
external assets position and R∗
t t h ee x t e r n a lr a t eo fr e t u r n ,w h i c hi ss t o c h a s t i c :
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Where R∗ is its unconditional mean and εR
t its stochastic shock, which follows a























There are three goods, an exportable (X),a ni m p o r t a b l e(M) a n dan o nt r a d a b l e
(N), and two production factors, labor (L) and capital (K). Capital is sector speciﬁc,
13while labor is freely mobile across sectors. The home economy produces X and N,
using L and K inputs, but consumes M and N. The law of one price holds for both
tradable goods. The external price of M w a sn o r m a l i z e dt oo n ea n da s s u m e dt ob e
constant, while the external price of X is stochastic with the following process:
P
X




Where PX∗ is its unconditional mean and εPX
t its stochastic shock in the external
market, which is the source of the terms of trade shocks. This shock follows a ﬁrst
























There are two types of internal agents: households and ﬁrms. Households own
ﬁrms, consume M and N goods, and supply L and K to the ﬁrms. They are the
only ones with access to external lending. There are two ﬁrms, the X producer and
the N producer. Both demand L and K to produce their goods, being the former
more capital intensive. The economy follows a balanced growth path and population
is assumed to be constant. In the following, the model is set in stationary terms.
5.1.1 Households
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t is consumption of importable, cN
t consumption of non tradable and lt
total hours worked. Having a external lending spread increasing on external debt not
only reproduce a unique steady state, but also allow the model to have a rate of time
preference diﬀerent from the external interest rate.
Since the international traded bond and capital are the only assets in this economy,
markets of contingent claims are incomplete and the economy’s wealth varies with























t + γbt+1 (9)
Where wt is the wage, q
j
t the rental rate of capital in sector j = X,N, π
j
t proﬁts in
ﬁrm j = X,N, PN
t the relative price of non tradable to importable and i
j
t investment
in capital j = X,N. Investment and capital are expressed in units of the importable
good, which is reasonable if we consider that the non tradable good is composed
mainly by services. The law of motion for both types of capital are:
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t For j= X,N (10)








t=0 to maximize (8),s u b -






































































































t are the lagrange multipliers on (9) and (10), respectively.
5.1.2 Firms
Both ﬁrms have Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale technologies. Their static








to maximize proﬁts, for j = X,N. Their
ﬁrst order conditions are:
Non Tradable Firm































































t is the productivity shock in each sector j = X,N respectively, which























5.1.3 Deﬁnition of a Competitive Equilibrium
Given b0, kX
0 and kN








, a competitive equi-
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t=0 solve ﬁrm X’s problem.






t=0 solve ﬁrm N’s problem.
Market clearing conditions are satisﬁed: cN
t = yN
t and lt = lX
t + lN
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t − γbt+1 =0
5.2 Steady State and Calibration
The calibrated values of parameters are pinned down by introducing the average
ratios of the main macroeconomic aggregates in Chile during the 1990s into the
model’s set of equilibrium conditions. Table 2 presents them, while Table 3 shows
the macroeconomic ratios in data and implied by the model.
The value of γ corresponds to the average rate of growth of GDP. Consumption
of N is equal to the non tradable output, while consumption of M is the rest of total
consumption. Note that in steady state the current account balance has to be equal
to zero. However, it was in deﬁcit for most of the 1990s. Thus, some adjustments
to the ratios in the model were made to calibrate a consistent steady state. The
fraction of exportable GDP on total GDP was increased from 0.36 in data to 0.40 in
16the model, and the fraction of investment on total GDP was reduced from 0.28 in
data to 0.27 in the model. The relative prices of X and N to M were both set equal
to 2 in the steady state.
The value of ρ was chose to match the value of elasticity of substitution between
cM and cN estimated by Ostry and Reinhart [31] for developing countries. The values
of  , λ, φ
X,φ
N and β were pinned down from the households ﬁrst order conditions.
The external interest rate was set in 5 percent, while the internal one in 5.06 percent.
The value of η was taken from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [29]. The coeﬃcients for
the production functions in each sector, αX and αN, were set such that the sectorial
allocation of labor were consistent with average in data, 30 percent in the exportable
sector and 70 percent in the non tradable sector, and with an average share of capital
income of 0.46 in the whole economy.
Table 2
Calibrated parameters values for Model 1
Parameters β γ ρ   θl αX αN
Values 0.95 1.05 -0.32 0.14 2.05 0.60 0.37
Parameters P λ φ δ v AX AN
Values 2.0 0.014 0.019 0.08 2.10 3.68 16.4
Table 3 shows that the calibration is consistent with the macroeconomic ratios
in data, except by the adjustments made to calibrate a consistent steady state. The
current account and trade balance deﬁcit as percentage of GDP were reduced from
3 . 4a n d0i nd a t at oz e r oa n d- 2 . 4i nt h em o d e l .
Table 3
Main aggregate ratios
Ratios yN/y yX/y i/y k/y kN/k kX/k h
Data 0.64 0.36 0.28 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.27
Model 0.60 0.40 0.27 1.85 0.48 0.52 0.27
Ratios hN/h hX/h cN/y cM/y b/y TB/y CA/y
Data 0.72 0.28 0.64 0.13 0.19 0.000 -0.034
Model 0.70 0.30 0.60 0.13 0.19 0.024 0.000
5.3 Simulations
5.3.1 Shocks processes
The model is simulated for exogenous and independent trajectories of shocks in ex-
ternal interest rate, terms of trade and total factor productivity. Table 4 presents the
estimated ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcients.
17These coeﬃcients are consistent with previous studies. The coeﬃcient for the
external interest rate is close to the 0.77 estimated by Mendoza [25] between 1988
and 1998, while the coeﬃcient for the terms of trade is close the value of 0.35 estimated
by Mendoza [26] between 1960 and 1990. The coeﬃcients for the productivity shocks
are in line with the standard values considered in the real business cycles literature.
Table 4
First order Autoregressive Coeﬃcients
r∗
t TOT Prod. X Prod. N
Coefficient 0.68 0.36 0.88 0.88
5.3.2 Results
Table 5 presents the average log deviation, and volatility, of the main variables in data
and diﬀerent models. Comparing the data to model 1 (columns 1 and 2), it shows
that the model predicts a smoother path of consumption of both goods, investment,
capital in both sectors and hours worked in the no tradable sector, but a more volatile
path of output and hours worked in the exportable sector than in data.
Table 5
Average Log-Deviations from Steady State and Volatility
18Data Model 1 Model 2
GDP Mean 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.040
Std. Dev. 0.031 0.031 0.016 0.031
Exportables Mean 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.017
Std. Dev. 0.022 0.063 0.032 0.022
Non Tradables Mean 0.055 0.053 0.052 0.055
Std. Dev. 0.037 0.016 0.014 0.037
Consumption Mean 0.057 0.046 0.047 0.051
Std. Dev. 0.035 0.019 0.018 0.042
Importable Mean 0.069 0.012 0.027 0.030
Std. Dev. 0.055 0.036 0.060 0.064
Investment Mean 0.064 -0.020 0.025 0.028
Std. Dev. 0.113 0.037 0.129 0.123
Hours Worked Mean 0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.005
Std. Dev. 0.030 0.029 0.026 0.030
Exportables Mean -0.005 0.006 -0.015 -0.010
Std. Dev. 0.072 0.121 0.097 0.071
Non Tradables Mean 0.009 -0.002 -0.008 -0.002
Std. Dev. 0.028 0.010 0.017 0.043
Capital Mean 0.011 -0.004 0.006 0.006
Std. Dev. 0.030 0.003 0.020 0.020
Exportables Mean 0.018 -0.006 0.007 0.007
Std. Dev. 0.030 0.005 0.021 0.021
Non Tradables Mean 0.053 -0.001 0.005 0.004
Std. Dev. 0.053 0.007 0.019 0.018
Model 3
Figures 6 presents the trajectories of the macroeconomic aggregates in data and
Model 1. The model predicts a bigger expansion in the exportable sector, and a
bigger contraction in the non tradable sector, than in data in 1995, year in which
the terms of trade showed a positive deviation of 20 percent. At the same time, it
predicts a bigger contraction in the exportable sector, and a bigger expansion in the
non tradable sector, than in data between 1998 and 2000, period in which the average
deviation on terms of trade was of -8 percent. These diﬀerences in the productive
structure in the model when compared to data are explained by a bigger reallocation
of hours worked from the non tradable sector to the exportable one when facing
positive terms of trade shocks, and the opposite when facing negative shocks.
Figure 6
Data and Simulation of Model 1
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At the same time, the model predict smoother paths of consumption and invest-
ment, which is consistent with the hypothesis of consumption smoothing. Individuals
isolate their expenditure decision from output volatility through external borrowing,
which causes an improvement in the current account balance when facing positive
terms of trade shocks, and a worsening in it when facing the opposite shocks.
Figure 6 (Continuation)
Data and Simulation of Model 1
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In conclusion, the friction-less model not only fails to predict volatility of aggregate
output, consumption, investment and capital, but also fails to predict the relative
reallocation of hours worked across sectors in response to the shocks. These results
show that considering a time invariant upward sloping supply of funds, dependent
only on the current level of external debt, is not appropriate to characterize the
Chilean economy’s business cycles during the 1990s.
In the next section we will explore wether an endogenous time varying upward
sloping supply of funds, dependent not only on the level of external debt, but also
on the current levels of income and expenditures, would improve the matching of the
model to the data for the period of analysis.
216 Introducing a External Borrowing Constraint
The functional form for the external borrowing constraint is taken from Mendoza [26],
and is set as the external lenders’ requirement to the internal households to ﬁnance
at least a fraction Ψt of their expenditures with their current income at date t.T h i s
fraction is taken from data, and introduced exogenously into the model, assuming




























Where the left hand side is the households’ current income and the right hand
side the self ﬁnanced fraction of expenditures. Combining (9) with (25), and using
















Equation (26) relates the amount of new debt contracted today to current output,
and not to next period output as a standard collateral constraint. This condition
can be interpreted as a collateral constraint in which external lenders are myopic.
This is, the best forecast they have about next period output is today’s output.
This formulation is in line with the argument that current fundamentals matter for
external lenders to decide how much to lend to a country in a given period.
External lenders maximize proﬁts facing a complete asset market. The tacitly
collude to impose this borrowing constraint over the households, which yields an
endogenous upward sloping supply of funds, where the spread between the internal
and external interest rates depends on the borrowing constraint multiplier.
6.1 Model
Consider a small open economy perfectly integrated with the rest of the world in
goods, but faces individual speciﬁc external borrowing constraints identiﬁed as the
requirement to the internal households to ﬁnance at least a fraction Ψt of their ex-
penditures with their current income at date t. This new setup only modiﬁes the
households problem, while the rest of the model is the same. Thus, only the modiﬁed
households’ problem is presented in this section.
There are three types of agents in this economy: Internal households and ﬁrms,
and foreign lenders. Internal households own ﬁrms, consume M and N, and supply
L and K to the ﬁrms. They face an external borrowing constraint. There are two
ﬁrms, ﬁrm X and ﬁrm N,b o t hd e m a n dL and K to produce their goods, but the
former is more capital intensive. External lenders set the borrowing constraint on the
internal households. The economy follows a balanced growth path and population is
assumed constant. In the following, the model is set in stationary terms.
226.1.1 Households
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t and µt are the lagrange multipliers on (9), (10) and (25).
6.1.2 Deﬁnition of a Competitive Equilibrium
Given b0, kX
0 and kN
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t=0 solve ﬁrm X’s problem.






t=0 solve ﬁrm N’s problem.
Market clearing conditions are satisﬁed: cN
t = yN
t and lt = lX
t + lN
t





t − γbt+1 =0
6.1.3 External Lenders
External lenders are risk neutral and face a complete asset market. Their problem
is to maximize the present value of their proﬁts subject to the borrowing constraint












This yields the following endogenous upward sloping supply of funds:
Rt − R
∗
t = RtµtΨt (37)
This is an upward sloping on external debt and expenditures and downward slop-
ing on income, given by the changes in the multiplier µt in response to these variables.
This functional form allows the model to have a unique steady state.
6.2 Steady State and Calibration
Table 6 presents the calibrated parameters for this new model. The ones in common
with Model 1 are the same, while Ψ and µ were pinned down from the households
F O C s .T h em a c r o e c o n o m i cr a t i o si nt h em o d e la r et h es a m et h a ni nM o d e l1 .
Table 6
Calibrated parameters values for Model 2
Parameters β γ ρ   θl Ψ αX αN
Values 0.95 1.05 -0.32 0.14 2.06 0.834 0.60 0.37
Parameters P λ φ δ v µ AX AN
Values 2.0 0.013 0.019 0.08 2.10 0.00069 3.68 16.4
6.3 Simulations
6.3.1 Shocks Processes
The model is simulated for the exogenous trajectories of the shocks on external inter-
est rate, terms of trade, total factor productivity and Ψt. All shocks are assumed to
follow a ﬁrst order autoregressive process and to be independent among them. The
24estimated ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcients are presented in table 7. The ﬁrst
four of them are the same than in Model 1.
Table 7
First order Autoregressive Coeﬃcients
r∗
t TOT Prod.X Prod.N Ψt
Coefficient 0.68 0.36 0.88 0.88 0.90
Figure 7 presents the trajectories of Ψt and µt. Panel (A) shows that households
were required to self ﬁnance an increasing fraction of their expenditures between 1993
and 1995, but a decreasing one after. This suggests that this constraint could have
contributed to the boom between 1995 and 1998 and could have allowed the country
to smooth partially the recession in 1999 and 2000.
Figure 7:
Self Financing Requirement and Ext. Borrowing Const.’s Multiplier
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Panel (B) shows a negative correlation between µt and terms of trade shocks.
The external borrowing constraint was tighter between 1999 and 2000 than in 1995,
despite that Ψt reached its maximum in 1995 and its minimum between 1998 and
2000. This ﬁgure that the fall in Ψt during the recession was not enough to isolate
consumption and investment completely from it.
6.3.2 Results
Column 3 in table 5 presents the average log deviations and volatility of Model 2’s
simulations. It shows, with respect to model 1, an improvement in the predicted
volatility of consumption of importable and investment, as well as in output, hours
worked and capital in the exportable sector. However, it predicts a smoother path of
non tradable output, induced by the counter cyclical path of total hours worked.
Figure 8 presents the time series in data and simulations of Models 1 and 2. It
shows that introducing the external borrowing constraint reduces the smoothing of
consumption of importable and investment, as well as it reduces the reallocation of
25labor across sectors. The slackening in the constraint between 1995 and 1998 allows
the model to reproduce the boom in investment and consumption of importable, and
its tightening in 1999 and 2000 allows the model to capture the fall in both.
Figure 8
Data and Simulation of Models 1 and 2
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At the same time, the slackening in the constraint during the boom reduces the
reallocation of labor from the non tradable sector to the exportable one, as well as
its tightening during the recession reduces the reallocation of labor in the opposite
direction. When the economy receives a positive shock in terms of trade, which
makes the constraint slacker, individuals want to consume more of both goods. The
importable one can be obtained in the external market, while the non tradable has to
26be produced domestically. This eﬀect prevents the economy from reallocating labor to
the exportable sector from the non tradable one in response to the shock. A negative
shock in terms of trade, which makes the constraint tighter causes the opposite.
Figure 8 (Continuation)
Data and Simulation of Models 1 and 2
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However, introducing the constraint makes total hours to be counter cyclical.
When the constraint gets slacker, individuals also want to have more leisure, while
when the constraint gets tighter makes them to reduce leisure. The ﬁnal outcome
is that individuals work less during the boom and more during the recession, which
is opposite to what is observed in data. This ends up aﬀecting output in the non
tradable sector. The economy produce and consume less non tradable goods in good
27times and more of it in bad times.
This problem has been attacked in the literature assuming that households have
GHH type preferences, where the labor-leisure decision depends only on the real
wage and not on wealth eﬀects. However this speciﬁcation it is not compatible with
balanced growth path, and implicitly assumes that agents in developing countries
have diﬀerent preferences than the standard ones used for developed ones. This next
section shows that it is not necessary to make this extreme assumption to solve the
problem. A sector speciﬁcl a b o rﬁnancing friction that drops during booms, and
increases during recessions, would make the model match both series.
7 Introducing Labor Wedges
This section introduces sector speciﬁc labor wedges to the model as a measure of
diﬀerentiated labor market distortions in each sector. Appendix 1 shows that such
speciﬁcation has an equivalent reduced form than a model with labor ﬁnancing fric-
tions. The objective is to evaluate wether distortions in the labor market could help
the model predicting better hours worked and output in the non tradable sector.
The exercise is deductive. It consists on ﬁnding the sector speciﬁc labor wedges
such that the model replicates the trajectories of output in both sectors. Its equiva-
lence with a model with labor ﬁnancing frictions will allow us to compare the average
wedge implied by the model with the average lending spread in data, as a measure
of relevance of this friction to characterize Chile’s business cycles during the 1990s.
7.1 Model
Consider a small open economy perfectly integrated with the world in goods, but
faces individual speciﬁc external borrowing constraints. The structure of the model
is the same than in section 6, but now both ﬁrms face sector speciﬁc labor wedges that
increase the labor cost diﬀerently across sectors. The revenues from the labor wedges
are rebated to the households such that the resource constraint remain unchanged.
External lenders set the external borrowing constraint on the internal households.
The economy follows a balanced growth and population is assumed to be constant.
In the following the model is set in stationary terms. This setup will only change
the ﬁrms’ problem, the rest of the model is the same. Thus, only the modiﬁed ﬁrms’
problem is presented in this version of the model.
7.1.1 Firms








j) For j = X,N (38)









































































































t ,w t,R t,
ª∞
t=0, such that:
Given prices, b0, kX
0 , kX
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t=0 solve ﬁrm N’s problem.
Market clearing conditions are satisﬁed: cN
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7.2 Steady State and Calibration
The labor wedges were set equal for both sectors in steady state, such that they
do not distort the relative allocation of labor and capital with respect to Model 2.
Therefore, the calibrated parameters as well as the implied macroeconomic ratios by
t h em o d e la r et h es a m et h a ni nM o d e l2 .
297.3 Simulations
7.3.1 Shocks processes
The model is simulated for the same exogenous trajectories of shocks than in section
6. T h el a b o rw e d g e sa r eb u i l ts u c ht h a tt h em o d e lr e p l i c a t e st h ep a t ho u t p u ti n
each sector. All shocks follow a ﬁrst order autoregressive process, which estimated
coeﬃcients are presented in table 9. It is assumed that the labor wedges are persistent.
Table 8
First order Autoregressive Coeﬃcients
r∗
t TOT Prod.X Prod.N Ψt τX τN
Coefficient 0.68 0.36 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.90
Figure 9 presents the sector speciﬁc labor wedges, the lending spread in data
and the borrowing constraint’s multiplier. Panels (C) and (D) show that, to match
output in both sectors, it is necessary to have decreasing wedges from 1993 to 1998,
and higher ones in 1999 and 2000, although more volatile for the exportable sector.
Figure 9:
Average Lending Spread, and Sector SpeciﬁcL a b o rW e d g e s
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Panel (A) shows that the average wedge in the model is similar to the lending
spread in data between 1993 and 1998, but higher in 1999 and 2000. This suggests
that the labor distortion during the 1990s could be due to the labor ﬁnancing friction.
The gap in the recession could be attributed to the high spread faced by small and
medium size ﬁrms crowded out of the internal ﬁnancial market in bad times, which
30is not reﬂected in the lending spread. Finally, panel (B) shows a similar path for the
borrowing constraint multiplier than in Model 2.
7.3.2 Results
Column 4 in table 5 presents model 3’s average log deviations and volatility. It shows
an improvement not only on sectorial output and total consumption, but also in
hours worked and its sectorial allocation. It does not change much the prediction of
investment, consumption of importable and current account.
Figure 10
Data and Simulation of Models 2 and 3
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Figures 10 presents the time series in data and simulations of models 2 and 3. Model
3 match better the data in aggregate consumption, hours worked and its relative
31allocation. In particular, the spike in the non tradable sector’s wedge in 1999 and
2000 replicates the fall in hours in this sector and the whole economy.
Figure 10 (Continuation)
Data and Simulation of Models 2 and 3
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T h ee x e r c i s es u g g e s t st h a ta na d e q u a t ec h a racterization of Chile’s cycles during
the 1990’s should consider sector speciﬁc labor distortions, which could be attributed
to labor ﬁnancing frictions for the whole period. The average wedge and lending
spread in data are similar between 1993 and 1998, while their diﬀerence in 1999 and
2000 could be explained by the increase in the spread charged to small and medium
size ﬁrms, with lack of collateral, crowded out of the ﬁnancial market in bad times.
328C o n c l u s i o n s
The diﬀerences on the cyclical pattern of consumption, investment, current account
and employment between standard models of small open economies and data can
be explained by the interaction of two ﬁnancial frictions, an external borrowing con-
straint and a sector speciﬁcl a b o rﬁnancing wedges, without recurring to non standard
assumption of preferences. Both frictions modify the optimal reaction of internal
agents to shocks.
A standard frictionless model predicts smooth consumption and investment over
time, and procyclical current account and employment. It predicts a bigger expansion
in exportable output, and a lower one in non tradable output, than in data for positive
terms of trade shock, and the opposite for negative terms of trade shock. Thus, it
predicts an improvement in current account in good times and a worsening on it in
bad times. This contrasts with data, in which consumption is highly procyclical,
current account is counter cyclical and employment is procyclical.
Introducing an external borrowing constraint, to the otherwise frictionless model,
reduces the smoothing over time of consumption of tradables and investment. It also
reduces the volatility of exportable output and replicates the path of current account
in data. However, for standard speciﬁcation of preferences, it predicts a counter
c y c l i c a le m p l o y m e n ta n da ne v e ns m o o t h e rp a t ho fo u t p u to fn o nt r a d a b l e .
A positive terms of trade shock, which makes the constraint less binding, causes
the households demand more importable and non tradable goods. This reduces the
predicted expansion in the exportable sector in response to the shock, while a negative
shock that tights the constraint, reduces the predicted fall in it. At the same time, a
less binding constraint, induces the individuals to work less and to produce less non
tradable goods. A more binding one, makes the individuals work more and produce
more non tradable goods. The ﬁnal outcome is a better forecast of exportable output,
but a counter cyclical employment and a too smooth path of non tradable output.
Introducing counter cyclical sector speciﬁc labor wedges to the model, as a measure
of labor market distortions, allows the model to replicate hours worked and non
tradable output in data. The wedge implied by the model suggest that the internal
lending spread is not a good measure of labor ﬁnancing distortions during recessions.
It does not account for the high spread faced by small and medium size ﬁrm crowded
out of the internal ﬁnancial market in bad times.
In conclusion, both ﬁnancial frictions seem to be relevant to characterize develop-
ing countries business cycles. The external borrowing constraint reduces the smooth-
ing of consumption of importable and investment over time, improves the relative
reallocation of factors and captures the cyclical pattern of current account. However,
it produces counter cyclical employment and a excessive smoothing of output of non
tradable. Counter cyclical sector speciﬁc labor ﬁnancing wedges would capture the
33cyclical pattern of employment and non tradable output without the need of setting
n o ns t a n d a r dp r e f e r e n c e s .
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368.1 Appendix 1: Introducing Labor Financing Frictions
Consider a small open economy perfectly integrated with the rest of the world in
goods, but faces individual speciﬁc external borrowing constraints identiﬁed as the
external lenders requirement to the internal households to ﬁnance at least a fraction
Ψt of their expenditures with their current income at date t.
There are four types of agents: Internal households, ﬁrms and banks, and external
lenders. Households own ﬁrms and banks, consume M and N, and supply L and K
to the ﬁrms. They face the external borrowing constraint, and supply funds inﬁnitely
elastically to internal banks within the period at the internal rate of return Rt,a n d
demand funds inﬁnitely elastically from the ﬁrms within the period at the same rate.
There are two ﬁrms, X and N. Both have constant return to scale technologies,
and use L and K inputs. They pay their wages before production is realized, facing a
credit in advance constraint in the internal ﬁnancial market. Banks face an inﬁnitely
elastic supply of deposits from households within the period at the rate of return Rt,
and lend to each ﬁrm subject to sector speciﬁc collateral constraints. They can only
be sure that each ﬁrm produces a fraction of its sector average output, which is the
collateral. All costs caused by this distortion are rebated to the households such that
the resource constraint does not change. The economy follows a balanced growth path
and population is constant. In the following the model is set in stationary terms.
8.1.1 Households
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t and µt are the lagrange multipliers on (9), (10) and (25).
8.1.2 Firms
Both ﬁrms get the credit at the beginning of each period, after the shocks are realized,
and repay it at the end of the same period once production is realized. They lend this
credit within the period to the households at the rate of return Rt.T h e i r o p t i m a l
decision is to hold just the necessary credit to pay wages in each period. Thus, the
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The banking industry is perfectly competitive. The role of banks is to take deposits
from the households and lend them to the ﬁrms. To produce credit they need some







t For j = X,N (58)
Where z
j





















t are the lagrange multipliers on (9), for X and N respectively.
8.1.4 Deﬁnition of a Competitive Equilibrium
Given initial values of foreign assets b0, capital kX
0 and kX

































Given prices, b0, kX
0 , kX











solve the household’s problem.







t=0 solve ﬁrm X’s problem.







t=0 solve ﬁrm N’s problem.






t=0 s o l v eb a n k ’ sp r o b l e m .
Market clearing conditions are satisﬁed: cN
t = yN
t , and lt = lX
t + lN
t .
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